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YOU’RE THE PROBLEM, OFFICER: WHETHER EXECUTIVE 
OFFICERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE SAME STANDARDS 




Many recent corporate scandals involved executive officers’ improper 
behavior. In the past twenty years, big names like Disney,1 Enron,2 and 
Nissan3 have all experienced officer misconduct at the expense of the 
corporation. In one notably outrageous example, Disney awarded its 
newly appointed executive officer Michael Orvitz more than $38 million 
in cash, plus $3 million in stock options to leave the position, even after 
he proved utterly incapable of performing the duties required and was 
completely disinterested in the position itself.4 Orvitz must have finally 
begun to believe in the “magic” of Disney on that payday, to be sure.  
Executive officer misconduct can lead to public humiliation, client 
loss, federal investigations, and shareholder distrust.5 As one leading 
corporate governance scholar stated, “the single major challenge 
addressed by corporate governance is how to grant managers enormous 
discretionary power over the conduct of business while holding them 
 
 1. See David Teather, Disney’s Shareholders Force Eisner out of Chairman’s Role, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/mar/04/usnews.citynews.  
 2. See Troy Segal, Enron Scandal: The Fall of the Wall Street Darling, INVESTOPEDIA (May 29, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/. Enron executives lead the 
company in using mark-to-market accounting procedures to hide unprofitable activities and defraud 
shareholders, who were led to believe the company was more profitable than it truly was. Id. As a result, 
several Enron executives were charged with securities fraud, conspiracy, and insider trading. Id.  
 3. See Michael Wayland, Scandal at Nissan deepens as CEO Saikawa resigns after admitting he 
was improperly overpaid, CNBC (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/09/nissan-ceo-saikawa-
to-step-down-on-september-16.html. Nissan executives falsified financial documents, concealing more 
than $327 million in fraudulent payments to themselves. Id. 
 4. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).This case explains 
that Michael Eisner, Disney’s CEO (and notably Orvitz’s good friend of over twenty-five years), allowed 
Orvitz to begin serving as Disney’s President even before Disney executed his employment contract. Id. 
at 281. During his time in the position, Orvitz stated on Larry King Live that he knew about 1% of what 
he needed to know in order to fulfill his job’s duties. Id. at 283. In addition, Vanity Fair published an 
article explaining that Orvitz cancelled all meetings with Disney’s’ chief financial officer to learn more 
about his position, stating that Orvitz "didn't understand the duties of an executive at a public company[,] 
and he didn't want to learn." Id. Not to mention, instead of working on improving in his position at Disney, 
he had already begun seeking employment elsewhere before he was even asked to leave. Id. 
 5. David Larcker & Brian Tayan, We Studied 38 Incidents of CEO Bad Behavior and Measured 
Their Consequences, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/we-studied-38-incidents-
of-ceo-bad-behavior-and-measured-their-consequences. 
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accountable for the use of that power.”6  Today’s business world is 
surrounded by nonstop media coverage, so an executive officer’s 
reputation undeniably matters to a corporation’s success and is one of its 
most valuable assets.7  
The consequences are real when a company’s executive officer 
misbehaves. Thus, there is a need for authority in determining how a court 
is supposed to act when an executive officer blunders while performing 
their duties. Must a court intervene and punish the officer? Or should a 
court give deference to the officer’s decision, knowing that hindsight 
judgment is never a proper way to analyze a business choice? Despite the 
ever-increasing need for legal authority regarding officers, there is 
surprisingly very little case law discussing the liability standards of these 
executives.8  
Consistent instruction relating to officer liability and responsibility has 
“remained under the legal radar,” and today there is still no concrete 
answer.9 As such, this Comment will examine the duties and liabilities of 
both corporate directors and officers, and address whether, given the 
current corporate governance landscape, officers should receive the 
deference and protections that directors have. Part II of the Comment will 
discuss the governing law, the duties of directors and officers, and the 
discrepancies between them in terms of the business judgment rule and 
other exculpatory protections. Part III of this Comment will discuss the 
rationales behind the business judgment rule and exculpatory protections 
and opine about how the discrepancies in officer and director liability 
should be resolved. Part IV will conclude by noting that this dearth of 
officer case law should be given more attention, and that officers should 
be afforded the same protections as corporate directors.   
II. BACKGROUND 
This Section will proceed by giving a brief overview of Delaware law 
and its importance in study of corporate law. Next, this Section will 
discuss the fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe to corporations 
under Delaware law. Finally, this Section will outline the discrepancies 
between the protections that Delaware law affords officers and directors 
by virtue of their positions. 
 
 6. Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315 (2011). 
 7. The Importance of a Business Executive’s Reputation, WASH. ST. 
U.,https://onlinemba.wsu.edu/blog/the-importance-of-a-business-executives-reputation/ (last visited Apr. 
14, 2020). 
 8. 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
DIRECTORS § 1.15 (2019). 
 9. Id.  
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A. Delaware Law 
State law generally governs the internal affairs of a corporation.10 Since 
the early 1900s, Delaware has been the most influential state in regulating 
the formation and management of corporations.11 Sixty-five percent of 
Fortune 500 companies and more than fifty percent of all publicly traded 
companies in the United States are incorporated in Delaware.12 Such a 
large percentage of corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware 
because its law provides both the stability and flexibility for a corporation 
to govern its own affairs with minimal judicial encroachment.13  
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) governs Delaware 
corporate law issues.14 The DGCL “helps entrepreneurs, corporate 
managers, and stockholders create wealth through the corporate form.”15 
The law governs the internal affairs of the corporation and the relationship 
between the company’s owners (stockholders) and managers (the 
directors and officers).16 Partisan divides when making amendments to 
the DGCL are virtually unheard of because the political parties 
understand that trillions of dollars are invested in corporations and they 
recognize the importance of ensuring that all stakeholders can rely on the 
DGCL for integrity and efficiency.17 
The Delaware Court of Chancery is tasked with interpreting the statutes 
within the DGCL.18 This court is widely recognized as having a 
specialized focus in dealing with corporate law issues.19 The court’s 
ability to parse out complex corporate law issues is unparalleled by any 
other court in the United States.20 Rather than having one judge and a 
panel of jury members, the court is comprised of five chancellors who are 
 
 10. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-general-corporation-law/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).  
 11. Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-
businesses-choose-delaware/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2020). 
 12. Why Delaware Corporate Law Matters So Much, DELAWARE INC.COM (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/why-delaware-corporate-law-matters-so-much/.  
 13. See About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10. To attest to Delaware law’s stability, 
“Delaware’s constitution requires a super-majority vote by the legislature to amend the corporation law, 
protecting the DGCL from one-time amendments proposed by special-interest groups or influential 
corporations.” Id.  
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Court of Chancery, DELAWARE COURTS, https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/ (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 18. See Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, 
DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-court-chancery-supreme-court/ (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2020). 
 19. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10. 
 20. Id.  
3
Brandenburg: You're the Problem, Officer
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] YOU’RE THE PROBLEM, OFFICER 713 
appointed by the Governor, subject to the advice and consent of the 
Senate.21 All appeals from the Court of Chancery go directly to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, which is composed of five justices who have 
specialized experience dealing with corporate law disputes.22 
With specialized judges weighing legal arguments and ultimately 
deciding corporate law disputes, the Delaware courts are known to 
produce well-reasoned and thoughtfully articulated decisions.23 This 
approach serves to create a large archive of case law that corporations 
may look to for guidance on a particular corporate law dispute.24 
Interestingly, while Delaware courts have the largest collection of 
information on corporate governance in the country, neither Delaware 
statutes nor case law delves deep into the responsibilities of arguably the 
most important actors in corporate affairs: a company’s executive 
officers.25 In fact, judicial and legislative directives on this front are quite 
sparse.26 In contrast, Delaware law contains a large amount of directives 
regarding director responsibilities, and the guidance is continually 
increasing over time.27  
B. Fiduciary Duties of Directors 
A corporation’s board of directors plays a critical role in the managing of its 
internal affairs: it has the power to make every high-level business decision for the 
corporation.28 However, when using this power, directors must comply with the 
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation.29 The duty of care requires a director 
to stay informed about developments in the corporation in order to make wise 
 
 21. Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, supra note 
18. 
 22. Id.   
 23. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Long Silence on Corporate Officers, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(MAY 23, 2017) https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/23/delawares-long-silence-on-corporate-
officers/. “When comparing an officer next to a director, the director is the person who takes part in 
managing important business affairs, while officers oversee daily aspects of the business.” Officer vs 
Director: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,  
https://www.upcounsel.com/officer-vs-director (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). 
 26. This sparseness is explained in part by the fact that the Delaware Court of Chancery did not 
have personal jurisdiction over an individual solely because he served as an officer of a corporation until 
2004. Michael Follett, Note, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A Look at the Current 
State of Officers' Fiduciary Duties and Advice for Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 565 
(2010). Additionally, boards of directors usually deal with officer misconduct by contract, rather than 
through the judicial system. Johnson, supra note 25.  
 27. Johnson, supra note 25.  
 28. Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, WOLTERS KLUWER (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/powers-and-duties-of-corporate-directors-officers. 
 29. Id.  
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business decisions.30A director’s duty of loyalty requires a director to act in the 
best interests of the corporation at all times, rather than advance their own self-
interest.31 The Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the duties of care 
and loyalty are the only duties that directors owe to the corporation.32 However, 
some circumstances require special applications of the duties of care and loyalty, 
such as the duties of candor or disclosure (the “Revlon duties”).33 Revlon duties 
require that a corporate board perform its fiduciary duties in a manner that 
maximizes the sale price of the enterprise.34 A director’s duty of candor or 
disclosure rests on the proposition that directors “fully and fairly” disclose all 
material information to shareholders in order to elicit shareholder action within the 
corporation.35 A breach of these duties on the part of a director is determined by a 
standard of gross negligence.
36
 
C. Fiduciary Duties of Officers 
1. Corporate Officers Generally 
When directors make decisions regarding the corporation, the officers 
are tasked with executing those decisions.37 The duties of a corporation’s 
officers are set forth in the bylaws of the corporation, or are decided by 
the directors pursuant to guidelines in the bylaws.38 In addition to duties 
of care and loyalty, officers owe additional duties of good conduct, a duty 
to provide information and assist directors in understanding reported 
information, and a duty to obey the principal, among others.39  
While executive officers are tasked with being the loyal servants of the 
corporation, this is not the reality for many corporations in the United 
States today. In addition to planning for the overall success of the 
corporation, the chief executive officer  (“CEO”) is tasked with leading 
 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.400 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001). In Revlon, the court found that where 
directors allow considerations other than maximizing shareholder profit affect their decision making, 
directors do not act in shareholders’ best interests and thus amounts to a breach of the business judgment 
rule. Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
 35. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). 
 36. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1631 (2005). Gross negligence is defined as an “amplification” of ordinary 
negligence, going beyond basic carelessness to include reckless or willful misconduct of a person. Richard 
Stim, Claims of Gross Negligence, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-
injury/claims-gross-negligence.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
 37. Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, supra note 28.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Johnson & Millon, supra note 36, at 1630-31.  
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the development and execution of long-term goals to maximize 
shareholder wealth.40 Executive officers have been known to lead their 
companies "like corporate emperors and empresses,” exerting power over 
other managers, directors, and even shareholders, who in their job 
description they are tasked with serving.41 To attest to this officer 
dominance, one scholar compared the CEO of a corporation to the 
President of the United States, deeming those occupations two of the most 
intriguing and influential positions in law and society to date.42  
Executive officers wield considerable power. When an officer uses that 
power but makes mistakes along the way, it raises the question of whether 
and how to hold them liable. The inquiry of whether officers should be 
treated the same as directors in terms of liability gets more complex when 
individuals hold dual positions as executive officers and directors. Over 
half of the companies in the S&P 500 Index have CEOs who 
contemporaneously hold the position of chairman of the board of 
directors.43 The CEO is the primary operational decision-maker at the 
company, while the chairman of the board is responsible for protecting 
the investors’ interests and overseeing the corporation in its entirety.44 
The chairman of the board is tasked with being the “boss” of the 
corporation and is not typically involved with the day-to-day operations 
of the business, allowing the CEO to run the corporation in a manner of 
their choosing.45  
2. Gantler v. Stephens:46 A Semi-Saving Grace for Officer 
Responsibilities  
Before 2009, there was no concrete answer of what fiduciary duties 
executive officers owed under Delaware law. A conclusive answer did 
not come into fruition until the Delaware Supreme Court issued its 
opinion n Gantler v. Stephens.47 In Gantler, shareholders of a corporation 
alleged that a group of the corporation’s directors and officers violated 
 
 40. What is a CEO (Chief Executive Officer)?, CFI, 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/careers/jobs/what-is-a-ceo-chief-executive-officer/ (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2020).  
 41. Tom C.W. Lin, CEOs and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1364 (2014). 
 42. Id.  
 43. David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Chairman and CEO: The Controversy over Board 
Leadership, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/26/chairman-and-ceo-the-controversy-over-board-leadership/.  
 44. What is a CEO (Chief Executive Officer)?, supra note 40. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 47. Id. 
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their fiduciary duties.48 The shareholders supported their allegations by 
explaining that the directors and officers refused to sell the corporation 
and, in turn, benefitted themselves by merely reclassifying shares and 
releasing a misleading proxy statement to induce shareholder approval.49  
In deciding the fiduciary breach question, the court first addressed 
whether both officers and directors owe identical fiduciary duties to the 
corporations they serve.50 The court, noting this question as being a matter 
of first impression, answered affirmatively.51 However, the court failed to 
mention whether officers should be given the benefit of the business 
judgment rule and whether they would be held to a standard of simple 
negligence as agents of the corporation or a lesser standard of gross 
negligence like directors.52 
3. Executive Officers Expanding their Reach: Increased use of 
Technology and The Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a 
Corporation 
Executive officers constantly look to make corporate governance 
decisions that maximize the long-term value of the corporations they 
serve. Two ways executive officers have generally attempted to keep up 
with the ever-changing business world in modern times are the increased 
use of social media and electronic news outlets, and an enlarged focus on 
the stakeholders of the corporation through the issuance of the Business 
Roundtable’s Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation.53 
In the digital age, executive officers are under an increased 
microscope.54 Because they are the faces of their companies, the way 
officers are perceived by stakeholders affects both public opinion and 
profitability of the corporation overall.55 Thus, officers’ individual careers 
and the corporation’s profitability rests upon the extent to which they 
mitigate reputational risks and negative public perception.56 However, 
reputation management proves to be increasingly difficult. In these days 
of round-the-clock access to sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Yelp, 
executive officers—particularly CEOs—must work to guard and manage 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 698. 
 50. Id. at 708-09. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Follett, supra note 26, at 575.  
           53. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-
promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. 
 54. The Importance of a Business Executive’s Reputation, supra note 7.  
 55. See id.  
 56. Id. 
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their reputations more than ever before in history.57 
Today, a CEO’s reputation may extend to activities that are beyond the 
corporation, and its products or services, in a practice known as CEO 
activism.58 CEO activism occurs when corporate leaders take public 
stances on controversial political and social issues—topics that have not 
traditionally been spoken of in the business world.59 While some CEOs 
claim they engage in activism out of personal conviction, others have 
stated that their speaking out contributes to a higher sense of corporate 
purpose, which is vital in modern society.60 This extension of the purpose 
of the corporation—to one that is responsible in social and political 
spheres, as well as economic,—is of great importance to millennials, who 
are beginning to dominate the markets as customers, employees, and 
shareholders.61  
The rise of CEO activism has incited formal statements from some top 
corporations committing to serve a purpose higher than merely creating 
shareholder value. While CEOs are tasked with running the corporation’s 
day-to-day activities, generating profits, and returning value to the 
shareholders, some have chosen to formally broaden the scope of their 
duties. In 2019, the Business Roundtable, composed of 188 CEOs of 
major U.S. corporations, redefined the duties of a corporation in its 
Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation.62 The statement, signed by 
181 of the Roundtable’s members, outlined a modern standard for 
corporate governance that pledges each CEO’s support of each 
corporation’s stakeholders, rather than just their shareholders.63 It 
highlights that corporations should work to deliver value to customers, 
invest in employees, deal fairly with suppliers, and support local 
communities, all alongside the traditional duty to maximize shareholder 
wealth.64  
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, The New CEO Activists, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-new-ceo-activists.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. Millennials tend to put significantly more weight on the social responsibility of 
corporations when making decisions on where to work and make purchases than the generation before 
them. See Ryan Rudominer, Corporate Social Responsibility Matters: Ignore Millennials At Your Peril, 
CENTER OF SOCIAL IMPACT COMM., https://csic.georgetown.edu/magazine/corporate-social-
responsibility-matters-ignore-millennials-peril/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2020). Millennials currently account 
for $1 trillion of U.S. consumer spending. Id. Businesses that ignore the higher sense of corporate purpose 
do so at their peril. Id.  
 62. David Benoit, Move Over, Shareholder: Top CEOS Say Companies Have Obligations to 
Society, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/business-roundtable-steps-
back-from-milton-friedman-theory-11566205200.  
 63. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 53. 
 64. Id.  
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D. Protections Given to Directors that are not Definitively Afforded to 
Officers  
Both directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporations 
they serve.65 This raises the question of whether it is proper to have a 
uniform approach in holding them liable for their breaches of those duties. 
Today, directors are afforded more definitive protections in their decision 
making. Delaware law provides that directors are to be afforded the 
presumption of the business judgment rule and other exculpatory 
protections. But these protections are not consistently or uniformly 
applied to officers. Where these protections are applied, courts provide 
sparse reasoning for their applications of the protections and to what 
extent they may apply in other instances.  
1. Business Judgment Rule 
i. Policies Behind the Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule provides that courts, when determining 
director liability, should not examine the quality of a director’s business 
decisions, but only the procedures used in reaching those decisions.66 The 
business judgment rule is “a presumption that, in making a business 
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”67 The rule is a defense that can reduce the 
liability exposure of directors to claims for mismanagement and breach 
of their duty of care.68  
Without subjecting officers to the more deferential business judgment 
rule, they would be held to a standard of simple negligence. For example, 
if an officer could have purchased a large piece of equipment at a cheaper 
price from an international retailer rather than domestic, then they could 
be deemed liable under a simple negligence standard.69 Or, if an officer 
failed to take into consideration input from an employee that would have 
prevented losses to the corporation, the officer could be held liable for 
their failure to consult the employee.70 In both of those scenarios, the 
 
 65. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009). 
 66. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2.01. The business judgment rule is not a substantive rule 
of law, but it is a presumption given to directors in their decision-making process. In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 758 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
 67. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2.01. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Graf, supra note 6.  
 70. Id.  
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officers could arguably be deemed negligent even though these types of 
mistakes occur frequently in the business world.71 
The business judgment rule seeks to protect and promote the role of the 
board of directors as the ultimate manager of the corporation.72 Thus, the 
rule serves to protect directors who made business decisions diligently, 
carefully, and who have not acted fraudulently, illegally, or in bad faith.73 
The rule is supported by three general policy rationales: (1) encouraging 
director risk-taking, (2) avoiding judicial encroachment into business 
decisions, and (3) ensuring the board’s role as the central decision-maker 
of the corporation.”74  
With the added backing of a diversified portfolio, many shareholders 
prefer corporate directors to take more risks in their business decisions, 
hoping that the decisions lead to a higher payout for them.75 The directors 
themselves, who may hold relatively small portions of the whole 
corporation’s stock, many times may not see the payoffs from their risk-
taking measures.76 Thus, the tension emerges of directors wanting to be 
risk-averse in order to keep the corporation on the straight-and-narrow, 
while shareholders advocate for the corporation to take risks to maximize 
profit. The business judgment rule seeks to resolve this issue by allowing 
directors to ease their apprehensions of making risky decisions that, in 
hindsight, may prove to be imprudent.77 
Directors already face informal sanctions for bad decisions, including 
unhappy shareholders who may vote them out of office or a decline of the 
corporation’s value.78 Judges do not stand to gain or lose in the same 
capacity as directors, and so the board should be afforded deference to 
make decisions without judicial interference.79 
The DGCL states that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation 
. . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”80 
The business judgment rule preserves the corporate governance scheme 
that was envisioned by the Delaware legislature.81 Deference to director 
decisions, rather than judicial interference in the decision-making of 
directors, assists in preserving the authority of the board of directors in 
 
 71. Id.   
 72. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 73. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2.01. 
 74. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 
(2005). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).  
 81. Johnson, supra note 74.  
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss3/5
720 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
the internal affairs of the corporation, rather than passing the authority to 
shareholders or judges who are unfamiliar with the business.82  This 
means that directors, upon learning about a fiduciary wrongdoing of a 
corporate officer, must investigate the alleged wrong and then decide 
whether to pursue a claim by means of litigation, settlement, or intra-firm 
sanction.83 
ii. Court Confusion Surrounding the Rule 
During In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,84 the court explained 
that “even where decision-makers act as faithful servants . . . their ability 
and the wisdom of their judgments will vary.”85 The court also noted that 
“the redress for failures that arise from faithful management must come 
from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of 
capital, and not from . . . Court[s].”86 In sum, the business judgment rule 
is supported by three general policy rationales: (1) encouraging director 
risk-taking measures, (2) avoiding judicial encroachment into business 
decisions, and (3) ensuring the board’s role as the central decision-maker 
of the corporation.”87  
While the business judgment rule certainly applies to directors’ 
decision-making, the business judgment rule has not found uniform 
acceptance in its application to officers of a corporation. In Gantler, the 
court assessed the defendant directors’ and officers’ conduct under some 
application of the business judgment rule.88 First, the court directed that 
on a motion to dismiss, the pled facts must support a reasonable inference 
that the board of directors breached either its duty of loyalty or its duty of 
care.89 After assessing the defendant directors’ alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duties, the court proceeded to look at whether the officers 
breached their fiduciary duties.90 The court concluded that because the 
officers never responded to a due diligence request, there could be a 
reasonable inference that they breached their duties as officers of the 
corporation.91 While not explicitly mentioning that the business judgment 
rule also applied to officers, the court implicitly applied the rule by 
determining that the officers acted in gross negligence of their duties. 
 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Johnson, supra note 74. 
 88. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 696,705-06 (Del. 2009). 
 89. Id. at 706.  
 90. Id. at 709.  
 91. Id.  
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The Third Circuit also addressed the business judgment rule’s 
application to officers, but its reasoning was vague. In the case of In Re 
Tower Air, Inc., the court partly affirmed the holding of a Delaware 
District Court and applied the business judgment rule to a decision made 
by corporate officers.92 The court confusingly and interchangeably talked 
about the business judgment rule’s application to directors only and to 
directors and officers together, without distinguishing between the two 
groups.93 The Third Circuit offered no discussion of its analytical 
approach in determining that the business judgment rule indeed applied 
to officers in the same capacity as it did directors.94 
Other Delaware courts have made a blanket statement that includes 
officers in the definition of those who are protected by the business 
judgment rule.95 However, in more recent Delaware cases, courts have 
acknowledged the controversy of whether the business judgment rule 
applies to officers.96 For example, in a 2016 case, Amalgamated Bank v. 
Yahoo! Inc., the court noted that a “vibrant debate” exists whether officers 
should be liable for simple negligence, like agents generally, or whether 
some other deferential standard of review, such as the business judgment 
rule, should apply.97 In addition, during In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder 
Litig., a 2018 Delaware Chancery Court opinion, the Vice Chancellor 
qualified his presumption that the business judgment rule applied to 
officers in a footnote of the opinion.98 He noted that “in deciding this 
motion, I have presumed . . . that the business judgment rule applies to 
[the defendant] as CEO. . . this point is not settled in our law and . . . there 
is a lively debate among members of the academy regarding whether 
corporate officers may avail themselves of business judgment rule 
protection.”99  
One court has refused to apply the business judgment rule to officers 
altogether. In Palmer v. Reali,100 a Delaware District Court did not 
address whether the business judgment rule applied to officers of a 
corporation because the parties did not cite any Delaware cases where the 
 
 92. 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 93. Id. at 238-39.  
 94. Id.  
 95. See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2016), 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 
A.2d 693, 777 n.588 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
 96. See, e.g., Palmer v. Reali, 211 F. Supp. 3d 655, 666 n.8 (D. Del. 2016); Amalgamated Bank v. 
Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 781 n.24 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
 97. Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 781 n.24.  
 98. No. 12698-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 563, at *27 n.113 (Ch. Dec. 10, 2018). 
 99. Id.  
 100. 211 F. Supp. 3d at 666 n.8.  
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courts applied the business judgment rule to corporate officers.101  
Model lawmaking bodies have realized the contours of determining 
executive officer liability and have drafted laws that support their stance. 
The Model Business Corporation Act states that non-director officers 
holding discretionary authority must discharge their duties with the same 
standards of care imposed upon directors.102 In addition, the American 
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations treats the duties of directors and officers alike. It notes 
that the law is rather well-settled that officers are held to the same duty of 
care and business judgment standards as directors.103 However, in a 
comment to the Model Business Corporation Act, the drafters suggested 
that an officer’s access to more corporate information than directors may 
potentially subject them to higher standards of scrutiny.104 
Evidently, current case law falls short of giving reasoned arguments in 
deciding to apply or not apply the business judgment rule to officers. 
Overall, case law and other legal materials indicate that courts still do not 
apply the business judgment rule to officers in the same definitive and 
broad fashion that they apply it to directors.  
2.  Exculpatory Protections 
While both directors and officers have identical fiduciary duties, the 
consequences for a breach of those duties may not be the same.105 The 
Delaware Supreme Court decided in  Smith v. Van Gorkom106 that 
directors of a corporation were grossly negligent in failing to inform 
themselves of the material facts surrounding a merger, and thus were 
personally liable for damages to shareholders.107 As a result, critics began 
predicting that the decision would lead talented board members to step 
down out of fear of being held personally liable for decisions made in 
good faith.108 The Van Gorkom decision received significant negative 
attention, prompting the Delaware legislature to create § 102(b)(7) of the 
DGCL.109  
Under DGCL § 102(b)(7), a corporation’s certificate of incorporation 
may include a provision that limits or fully eliminates the personal 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 cmt. 
 103. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8. 
 104. Graf, supra note 6.  
 105. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 696,709 n.37 (Del. 2009). 
 106. 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985). 
 107. Id. at 893.  
 108. Graf, supra note 6.  
 109. Follett, supra note 26.  
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liability of a corporate director or its  shareholders for breach of a 
fiduciary duty.110 Most Delaware corporations have exculpation 
provisions within their certificate of incorporation, to the extent that § 
102(b)(7) provides for them to be used.111 The purpose of DGCL § 
102(b)(7) is “to encourage directors to undertake risky, but potentially 
value-maximizing, business strategies, so long as they do so in good 
faith.”112  
While, as the Gantler court noted, a similar provision is “legislatively 
possible” with respect to corporate officers, there is currently no section 
within the DGCL that allows for the creation of exculpation provisions 
for corporate officers.113 Thus, unless the Delaware legislature creates 
such a provision, the finding of a fiduciary breach will likely not be the 
same for both directors and officers, and could hinge entirely on the 
position that an individual holds. For example, even if a director and an 
officer of the same corporation are found to have committed the same 
form of misconduct, the director could be shielded from personal liability 
under DGCL § 102(b)(7)’s exculpatory provisions, while the officer 
could be held personally liable for hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Outside of Delaware, however, seven states have resolved this 
inconsistency and allowed for exculpatory protections for corporate 
officers.114   
III. DISCUSSION 
This Section will start by discussing whether directors and officers 
should be subject to the same standards of liability and will opine about 
if, and to what extent, the business judgment rule should apply to officers. 
Then, this Section will comment on whether officers should receive any 
exculpatory protections for their wrongdoings.  
A. The Business Judgment Rule  
1. Policy Rationales Applied to Officers 
As discussed above, directors of corporations are held to a gross 
negligence standard, while officers, as agents of the corporation, have 
historically been held liable for simple negligence.115 Some commentators 
 
 110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).  
 111. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,752 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 696,709 n.37 (Del. 2009). 
 114. Follett, supra note 26.  
 115. Johnson & Millon, supra note 36, at 1639.  
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argue that directors and officers should be treated the same for liability 
purposes and be given the benefit of the business judgment rule because 
the rationale for the rule applies equally to officer decisions.116 Others 
conclude that because of the officers’ proximity to the day-to-day 
workings of the corporation, and since corporate scandals are typically 
perpetrated by officers rather than directors, officers should be subjected 
to higher standards of liability.117 Commentators that support the latter 
argument contend that imposing an ordinary negligence standard of 
conduct without the benefit of the business judgment rule is proper.118  
To determine whether the business judgment rule should be applied to 
officers, a starting point is to look at the policy rationales surrounding the 
presumption. The reasoning in support of the presumption’s applications 
to directors is to protect business decisions that were made diligently and 
carefully, and not fraudulently, illegally, or in bad faith. 119 One scholar, 
arguing that the business judgment rule should not apply to officers, stated 
that the business judgment rule is supported by three general policy 
rationales: (1) encouraging director risk-taking measures, (2) avoiding 
judicial encroachment into business decisions, and (3) ensuring the 
board’s role as the central decision-maker of the corporation.120 This 
Section will discuss this scholar’s policy rationales, weighing whether the 
rationales’ application to corporate directors would similarly apply to 
officers.  
i. Encouragement of Director Risk-Taking Measures 
Like directors, executive officers may hold very little portions of the 
corporation’s stock compared to the total stock issued and have 
diversified portfolios themselves.121 As such, officers, like directors, are 
unlikely to reap the total upside potential that comes from their risk-taking 
measures, even if they are given a pay raise. Arguably, while officers 
might be more prone to making risky business decisions because a larger 
portion of their income is incentivized, in many cases officers choose to 
“play it safe” to protect their jobs.122 If the corporation performs badly, 
officers have more on the line–including potentially their entire career–
than directors, whose income tends to be more stable. In addition, officers 
 
 116. See Graf, supra note 6.  
 117. See Johnson, supra note 74. 
 118. Id.  
 119. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8. 
 120. Johnson, supra note 74.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. A CEO's compensation "is variable in nature, in the sense that they only benefit if their 
company meets or exceeds prescribed targets." Id. 
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face more severe intra-firm sanctions by way of being agents of the 
corporation. Before the corporation has even suffered, if the board or 
shareholders finds their actions ill-advised, they may remove officers 
from their position immediately.  
ii. Avoidance of Judicial Encroachment into Business Decisions 
Hindsight vision is 20/20.This applies to decisions made by both 
officers and directors. Like directors, officers make reasoned decisions 
they believe to be in the best interests of the corporation given the 
information they have at the time. With any decision, when given a 
second look at some point in the future, a chosen course of action may 
turn out to not have been the most prudent. While some argue that officers 
have more information than directors, an officer’s access to information 
is not absolute, and decision-making can be burdened by time constraints 
and additional stresses in times of corporate crisis.123 In addition, directors 
have the same authority within the corporation to gain access to 
information as officers, so a difference in decision-making scrutiny by 
way of informational access is not persuasive.124 Officers should be 
afforded the same protections as directors when making tough calls. 
Courts are not in a position to second-guess an officer’s decision-making 
tactics because doing so would be a second-guessing of the decision itself, 
which courts cannot, in good faith, attempt to do given a court’s limited 
information about each corporation in the context of litigation.  
The most basic argument in favor of treating directors and officers the 
same in terms of liability is that because they have identical fiduciary 
duties, as determined in Gantler, the consequences for breaches of those 
duties should be identical as well.125 However, the argument that officers 
should be held to a simple negligence standard, while valiant, fails in a 
real-world application. If officers were held to a standard of simple 
negligence, they could be held liable for activities that frequently occur 
in the regular course of business.126 In transactions that occur all the time 
in corporate America, it is not justifiable or equitable for courts to hold 
well-intending officers liable for monetary damages for going about in 
the regular course of business. Holding officers to such stringent 
standards can cause officers to face “decision paralysis” in the midst of 
complex transactional decisions they make every day that require 
immediate, well-reasoned solutions.127 The frequency with which 
 
 123. Graf, supra note 6. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
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business decisions are made, which later turn out to be unwise, is not 
evidence of officer misconduct so much as it shows the inherent risk of 
business.  
Allowing officers to benefit from the business judgment rule will not 
destroy accountability. The purpose of the business judgment rule is not 
to excuse officers from the duty to exercise due care in their decision-
making processes.128 Rather, its aim is to prohibit the retrospective use of 
a business decision’s poor outcome to conclude that care was not 
exercised.129 Just as with directors, officers have informal sanctions 
within the corporation—like termination and pay decreases—that will 
hold them accountable for their wrong actions. At the end of the day, as 
noted in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., it is the markets and 
shareholders that should be a reflection of the decisions that officers make 
every day, not the courts.130 
iii. Ensuring the Board’s Role as the Central Decision-Maker of the 
Corporation 
Affording officers the presumption of the business judgment rule still 
preserves the corporate governance scheme that the DGCL drafters 
envisioned.131 However, one may argue that sheltering an officer's 
conduct from judicial review by using the business judgment rule 
undermines a board's decision to hold its agent to the relevant standard.132 
For example, if an officer was charged with breaching a duty of care in 
their decision-making, a court could use the business judgment rule to 
shield the officer from liability even against the boards wishes to hold the 
officer accountable. Allowing courts to defer to officer decisions against 
the wishes of the board is a shortfall of applying the business judgment 
rule to officers. But it is worrisome to think that officers could be held to 
higher standards of liability than the ultimate managers of the corporation, 
its board of directors.133 Shielding the board members with the business 
judgment rule while subjecting officers to a higher standard of liability is 
inconsistent with the corporate governance scheme envisioned by the 
DGCL. True managers of the corporation should be subject to the same—
if not higher—thresholds of liability as their agents. Given the large 
 
 128. Johnson, supra note 74. 
 129. Id. The author of this article conceded this even though he did not support the proposition that 
the business judgment rule should be applied to officers.  
 130. 907 A.2d 693, 698. 907 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). (the business and affairs of every corporation should 
be managed by the board of directors).  
 132. Johnson, supra note 74.  
 133. Graf, supra note 6. 
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number of CEOs who contemporaneously serve as chairman of the 
corporation’s board of directors, it is also troubling to think that these 
individuals can be held to different standards of liability based entirely on 
the position they hold. 
2. Other Considerations Given Case Law, Legislative Precedent, and an 
Expansion of Officer’s Scope  
Compelling judicial authority indicates that jurisdictions support the 
application of the business judgment rule to officer decisions.134 A large 
majority of corporations incorporate in Delaware based on the freedom 
Delaware law provides a company to manage its affairs internally, with 
minimal interference from the courts.135 Such freedom, as vital to 
corporations as it is, must be considered when determining the scope of 
officer liability. Delaware, the weightiest state in regards to corporate 
governance, has taken the stance that officers should enjoy the business 
judgment presumption as recently as in 2018.136 In addition, various 
model rules indicate that directors and officers should be routinely held 
to the same standards of liability.137 While not completely settled, if a 
Delaware court were to take up this issue, it should find that the business 
judgment rule applies to decisions made by officers and that they should 
be held to a standard of gross negligence, just as directors are. 
Recent corporate scandals seen in the news should not be a factor in 
deciding whether officers should be afforded the business judgment rule’s 
presumptions. Due to the mainstream media, executive officers already 
have more checks than ever before on what they do on a day-to-day basis. 
Today, when officers commit misdeeds, people will quickly hear about it 
in great detail. This suggests that the rate of corporate officers committing 
misdeeds has not increased, but that the general public hears about these 
scandals more by way of social media and news sites. There are bad 
apples in every profession. The fact that the public knows more about 
corporate officer misdeeds than ever before should stay out of the 
equation in determining whether officers deserve the benefit of the 
business judgment rule.  
If recent scandals perpetrated by corporate officers can be a factor in 
determining whether officers deserve the benefit of the business judgment 
 
 134. See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2016); 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 
A.2d at 777 n.588; Stanziale v. Nachtomi (In re Tower Air, Inc.), 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005); In re 
Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12698-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 563, at *27 n.113 (Ch. Dec. 10, 
2018).  
 135. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10. 
 136. In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 563, at *27 n.113. 
 137. E.g., KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8. 
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rule, CEOs’ activism and extended scope into other areas must also come 
into the formula. Many CEOs of leading corporations in the United States 
have expressed their desire to serve all of their corporations’ stakeholders, 
rather than merely shareholders.138 The newly released Statement on the 
Purpose of a Corporation shows these CEOs’ commitments to better 
themselves and to work on the way they are portrayed in their 
communities. 139While the signatory CEOs do not nearly represent all of 
the corporations in the country, many of the top corporations in the world 
are represented.; Thus, the statement is a step in the right direction that 
other CEOs and executives will surely follow.140 Even if, to take the 
cynical view, the rise in CEO activism is just an effort to appease 
millennials, more officers are starting to take notice of the effect of 
philanthropic measures on corporations’ bottom lines. Officers will 
continue to clean up their acts because they know the markets are 
watching.  
B.  Exculpatory Provisions 
Given that the rationale of the DGCL § 102(b)(7) is to encourage 
directors to undertake risky business strategies so long as they do so in 
good faith, exculpatory protections should also be permitted  to 
officers.141 As afforded to directors, the exculpatory protections do not 
merely issue a free pass for board members to do as they please. Likewise, 
these protections, if they are applied to officers, would not shield officers 
from any decisions deemed to be made in bad faith or breaches of 
fiduciary duties, which generally is what a court would be most likely to 
find has occurred in the recent corporate scandals. Exculpatory 
protections are merely other tools to protect against judicial second-
guessing into the decision-making of corporate officers. Allowing 
officers to receive the benefit of exculpatory protections will encourage 
officers to make value-maximizing, yet potentially risky, decisions.  
In addition to encouraging officer risk-taking when they otherwise may 
be inclined to “play it safe,” exculpatory provisions should be afforded to 
officers because the current DGCL provision allows for inconsistent 
punishment of officers and directors who misbehave equally. Without 
officers receiving the benefit of exculpatory provisions, they are being 
severely punished monetarily for their misdeeds, while directors virtually 
get off scot-free, even if they committed the same act in good faith. The 
 
 138. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 53. 
        139.  Id.  
 140. See Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
 141. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
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inconsistency must be resolved by officers receiving access to 
exculpation. 
As critics predicted after the Van Gorkom decision, Delaware 
corporations will likely continue to lose qualified individuals to serve as 
officers if those individuals are not afforded exculpatory provisions. 
When faced with hard calls on business decisions, officers may 
instinctively try to put the blame on others, rather than take accountability 
themselves, out of fear of being held personally liable for a wrong 
decision. This blame-shifting can cause turmoil to the inner-workings of 
a corporation. It could change the officer’s focus to drumming up methods 
of avoiding responsibility for their decisions if they turn out badly. If the 
goal is to obtain talented and honest agents of the corporation, officers 
should be protected from decisions that in hindsight could prove to be 
imprudent. Policy rationales and inconsistencies in punishment under the 
current law dictate that the current DGCL provision should be amended. 
As seven other states have already done, the Delaware legislature should 
enact a provision that uniformly allows for the exculpation of a 
corporation’s directors and officers in their by-laws.142 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is justifiable to be skeptical of executive officers, given recent 
outrageous corporate scandals. Officers that partake in criminal activity 
deserve to be punished to the highest extent possible. However, while 
there have been numerous scandals perpetrated by corporate officers in 
the news today, the fact remains unclear whether officers have become 
increasingly more conniving, or if corporate scandals are merely 
receiving more attention as a reflection of the around-the-clock news 
media. Regardless, recent corporate scandals should not come into the 
equation in determining the application of the business judgment rule and 
exculpatory protections to executive officers.  
The dearth of case law surrounding executive officer liability is 
alarming and should be resolved by officers receiving the business 
judgment presumption and exculpatory protections. Policy rationales 
behind the business judgment rule support its application to officers. In 
addition, the most current case law and model legislation favor officers 
and directors being held to the same standards of liability. Executive 
officers continue to take steps to clean up their acts and create long-term 
value in the political and social arenas—places traditionally outside of a 
corporation’s scope. Officers should also be afforded exculpatory 
provisions within a corporation’s by-laws. Without exculpatory 
 
 142. Follett, supra note 26.  
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provisions, corporations will continue to miss out on talented individuals 
who fear being held personally liable for mere negligent acts that occur 
in the regular course of business. Exculpatory protections should be 
offered to officers in order to show Delaware’s deference and confidence 
in officer’s good faith decision-making.   
The cure for officer malfeasance should not be worse than the disease 
itself. 143 Allowing courts to intervene on the business decisions of 
corporate officers but not their director counterparts may be theoretically 
sound, but in practice may work to undermine the inner-workings of a 
corporation. Unless grossly negligent, officers should be afforded wide 
deference to their decisions, just as directors are. Courts should only 
interfere with a corporation’s internal affairs when prompted to by 
breaches of fiduciary duties, and leave the hindsight judgment and simple 
negligence issues to be handled by the corporation internally, 
shareholders, and the market.  
 
 143. Graf, supra note 6.  
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